Jan Thümmel
SUMMARY
Relative Totality as a Source of Difference in Schelling’s Philosophy of Identity
The article offers a reconstruction of Schelling’s concept of relative totality within the framework of his philosophy of identity, with a particular focus on its role as a source of difference. Relative totality is presented as a key structural element of Schelling’s system, enabling the articulation of difference within absolute identity. The analysis shows that the being as well as the form of absolute identity remain intact, while quantitative differences allow for the emergence of relative totalities that introduce a formal – though not real – differentiation between individuals and the whole. Whereas in his Presentation of My System of Philosophy (1801), Schelling considers the possibility of methodologically positing something beyond absolute identity, in Philosophy and Religion (1804) he develops this notion further through the concept of a fall from the absolute into actual non-being. The development of Schelling’s philosophy of identity thus reveals a tension between formal and ontological difference, raising the question of the possibility of real difference within a system.